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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
for punishment by fine and imprisonment, and also for a money
penalty for each offense, in an action for the penalty, evidence of the
defendant's prior acquittal in a criminal proceeding was held to be
inadmissible for want of mutuality, since the record of conviction
would not have been evidence against him.3 It is obvious why a judg-
ment of acquittal in a criminal case should not be used by or against
a defendant in a civil action, inasmuch as it is merely a determination
that guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. But
where a party has been convicted in a criminal action for falsifying
certain facts, there seems to be no reason why he should be allowed
to attempt to prove in a civil action that the facts were not falsified. 4
In the principal case, the court appreciates the illogic of holding that
conviction is only presumptive and not conclusive evidence of the
material facts but prefers to abide by the sanctity of the doctrine of
stare decisis and to leave to the legislature the task of changing the
established New York rule. We feel that the pruning of the archaic
precedents-unpleasant though the process may be-might have been
done with just as much grace by the court.
A.S.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS-RIGHT OF
TENANT TO INTERPOSE COUNTERCLAIM THAT ACCRUED PRIOR TO
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASEHoLD.-On February 10, 1930, the Correll
Real Estate Corporation assigned a leasehold estate to the petitioner,
the Stafford Security Company. The respondent, Kremer, was a sub-
tenant. After $3,500 in rent had accrued and remained unpaid,
proceedings to dispossess were instituted. The subtenant set up by
way of defense a counterclaim for rent due from premises occupied
by the assignor and owing before notice of assignment to the peti-
tioner. The petitioner objected to the counterclaim on the ground
that at the time the assignment was made the assignor had not yet
supplied the consideration, namely, possession of the land, in return
for which the defendant was under a duty to pay the installment of
rent now sued for. Held, A tenant cannot set off against a claim for
rent, claims which materialized before the assignment of the lease-
hold. Stafford Security Co. v. Kremer, 258 N. Y. 1, 179 N. E.
32 (1931).
The law relative to counterclaims where plaintiff sues on an
assigned claim has been set forth in the adjudicated cases. A person
'People v. Rohrs, 49 Hun 150, 1 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1888).
'Cf. the extreme to which this doctrine has been applied in New Jersey,
where, in a suit to forfeit a husband's interest in his wife's property on the
ground that he murdered his wife, the record of his conviction of the murder
was held to be inadmissible. Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N. J. Eq. 292, 155 At].
6 (1931).
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having a cause of action for injury to his property may assign the
claim and the assignee may sue. The latter takes the claim subject to
any counterclaims existing between the original parties.1 The defen-
dant must have acquired the counterclaim in good faith and before
the cause of action was assigned.2 The cause of action to be counter-
claimed must have accrued at the time of the assignment.3  The
counterclaim must be in contract 4 and the defendant cannot recover
more than the plaintiff's demand. 5 The principal case introduces no
new principle of law but reflects the attitude of the courts in inter-
preting the law pertaining to counterclaims. The equities in favor
of the petitioner are clear. He purchased the leasehold arid the
tenant enjoyed its occupancy until the value of its use was a sizeable
item to be counterclaimed against. The case under discussion is no
new departure in the application of equitable principle to counter-
claims.6 In another recent case 7 a counterclaim was allowed even
though it was admitted by the court that at law a defendant could
not set up a counterclaim, if the plaintiff owed it to a copartnership
of which the defendant was a member. Undoubtedly courts of equity
will extend the doctrine of set off in cases where special equities
intervene.8 In this case the plaintiff was unable to pay the partner-
ship claim because of insolvency. This was such a special cir-
cumstance sufficient to extend the law of counterclaims, and the part-
nership claim with the consent of the firm members was allowed.9
The decision in the instant case adjudicates the rights of the parties.
The tenant still has his claim against the assignor and the new owner
of the reversion is compensated for the use of his leasehold. In con-
clusion, in the case under discussion, the court said, if the decision
were otherwise, "the assignee of the reversion would be unable to
collect rent from a tenant during an unexpired term extending over
many years, if before notice of the assignment, the tenant had become
1American Guild v. Damon, 186 N. Y. 360, 78 N. E. 1081 (1906) ; Seibert
v. Dunn, 216 N. Y. 237, 110 N. E. 447 (1915).
-N. Y. C. P. A. §267, Lindemann v. Globe Indemnity Co., 123 Misc. 530,
205 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1924).
Michigan Savings Bank v. Millar, 110 App. Div. 670, 96 N. Y. Supp. 568
(1st Dept. 1906).
"'Supra note 2.
Faulkner v. Swart, 55 Hun 261, 8 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1889).
Burns v. Lopez, 256 N. Y. 123, 175 N. E. 537 (1931).
7 Ibid.
' The Court in Burns v. Lopez, supra note 6, evidently follows this doctrine,
for at 128, 175 N. E. at 538 the Court, quoting 3 STORY, EQUITY JTRISPRUDENCE
(3rd Eng. ed.) §1437a, said: "There is no doubt that courts of equity did even-
tually extend the doctrine of set-off, and claims in the nature of set-off, beyond
the law, but they only did so where peculiar equities intervened between the
parties. The cases in which a set-off was allowed on special grounds are so
very various as to admit of no comprehensive enumeration."
'See, in this connection, Rothschild v. Mack, 115 N. Y. 1, 21 N. E.
726 (1889).
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the owner of a cause of action on contract against the assignor. Such
a result is too harsh; it would impress too great a clog upon the free
alienation of land. ** *" 10
C.V.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE APPEAL AND ERRoR-CIVIL PRACTICE
ACT SECTION 211-A GIVES No RIGHT OF APPEAL AS AGGRIEVED
PARTY TO DEFENDANT UPON REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT AGAINST Co-
DEFENDANT.-An iron cover hurled into the air by an explosion in
a manhole struck plaintiff. A gas corporation and street railway
company were sued jointly to recover for the injuries sustained.
Plaintiff recovered against both defendants on the trial. The Ap-
pellate Division ' reversed the judgment as to the street railway com-
pany. Gas corporation appealed from this reversal on the ground
that it deprived appellant of its right to contribution from its co-
defendant. Held, appeal dismissed and judgment affirmed. 2  Ward
v. Iriquois Gas Corp., 258 N. Y. 124, 179 N. E. 317 (1932).
The Court of Appeals has indicated again 3 that the significance
attached to the comparatively new 4 addition to the Civil Practice
Act, Section 211-a,5 was greatly over-estimated and the confusion
"Instant case at 5, 179 N. E. at 33.
'233 App. Div. 127, 251 N. Y. Supp. 300 (4th Dept. 1931). Crouch, J.,
dissented from the holding of the Appellate Division on the ground that the
evidence did not warrant a dismissal of the judgment agains tthe street railway
company. The question of the construction of §211-a and the right of the
gas corporation to have its co-defendant remain in the action was not before
that court.
2 Gas corporation, as a second point, appealed from the decision of the
Appellate Division affirming the judgment as to it. Lehman, 1., dissented
from so much of the ruling of the Court of Appeals as affirmed the judgment
against the gas corporation.
'Price v. Ryan, 255 N. Y. 16, 173 N. E. 907 (1930) held that a defendant
cannot complain because a jury failed to find co-defendant negligent; Fox v.
Western New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (1931)
decided that a co-tort-feasor cannot be brought in under §193, subd. 2, in order
to give effect to §211-a of the CIVIL PRAcTicE. AcT.
'N. Y. L. 1928 c. 714.
"Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or
more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, and
such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defen-
dants, each defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be
entitled to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so
paid over and above the pro rata share of the defendant or defendants making
such payment; provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay
to any other such defendant an amount greater than his pro rata share of the
entire judgment. Such recovery may be had in a separate action; or where the
parties have appeared in the original action, a judgment may be entered by one
such defendant against the other by motion on notice."
